UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-1-2014

Nichols v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40798

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Nichols v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40798" (2014). Not Reported. 1338.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1338

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Ray M. Nichols, #36258
I.S.C.I., Unit 9
Post Office Box 14
Boise, Idaho
83707
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court Docket No. 4-0-7989-2013
Ada County No. 2012-19714
o
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO
The Honorable Judge Moody Presiding

Ray M. Nichols,
Appellant

vs:

State of Idaho ,
Respondent

REPLY

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

1
2

SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO RESPONSE OF THE STATE

First of all, the State of Idaho sought from this Court, and

3 was granted, three extensions of time to file the Responsive Brief.
4 The State lead this Court, and the ~ppellant, to believe that such
5 extensions of time were necessary so that, " ••• they could performa
6 an investigation of the facts of the Petition for Post Conviction
7 Relief and the appeal filed herein".
8

So, after waiting for a period of 120 days, (After the Brief

9 of Appellant was filed), the State of Idaho then files a 2 page
10 argument in opposition to the Appeal filed.
11

The Appellant would ask the State of Idaho, where is the

12 part of the Responsive Brief that needed an additional 120 days to

14 investigate? The reasons given to this Court by the Respondent for
15 those extensions of time were false and used for no purpose but to
16 delay this case.
- 17
18
19
20

Secondly, the State of Idaho on page 6 of the Response, states,
" ••• Nichols has cited to no authority for his proposition
that a challenge to the legality of a sentence implicates
a Courts' subject matter j urisdici ton".
If the State of Idaho would have simply read the Brief that

21

was filed, it would have clearly seen that Nichols is alleging that

22

he has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment that is not

23

authorized by statute, and because of that the District Court did

24

not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter into such a sentencing

25

Order. That is the argument in this case. It is not that the sentence

26

is illegal, it is that the sentence is not authorized for the Court

27

to even impose, and therefore there is no subject matter jurisdiction

28

for the Court to have acted.

Reply Brief •••••••••••••••••••••• I

And, in the face of the Statement of the Respondent, the
2Opening Brief of Appellant is simply full of amthority in support
3 of the position that if a Court enters into any judgment or order
4 that is not authorized by Statute, then it has entered such without
5 Subject Matter Jurisdiction to do so.
6

The argument of the State that the Petition for Post Conviction

7 Relief is not timely is not correct, and that ~oes to the heart of
8

9

this case, and the error of the District Court in denying the Petition.
Under the Idaho Code, §19-4902, (a) a Petition for Post

10 Conviction Relief may be filed at any time within one, (1) year mS
11 the expiration of the time for an appeal or from the determination
12 of proceedings following an appeal, which ever is later.
14

In 2013 the Petitioner filed a Motion to Correct an illegal

15 sentence under Idaho Criminal court Rule 35. A criminal Rule 35
16 Motion does qualify as, " ••• or from the determination of proceedings
-

17 following an appeal", pursuant to §19-4902,

18

(a).

Therefore, the Petitioner had one year from the denial of the

19 Rule 35 Motion, (Or the appeal thereof), in which to file for Post
20 Conviction Relief.
21

The instant Petition for Post Conviction Relief was therefore

22

timely filed because it was filed within one year of the time the

23

District Court denied the Rule 35 Motion.

24

In further support of this argument, at no time was the Rule

25

35 Motion denied as untimely, and therefore it is very clear that

26

the Petitioner did have one, (1) year frmm that denial, or the

27

denial of the appeal thereof, to file his Petition for Post

28

Convitt~on ~el~~f.
Reply Brief •••••••••••••••••••• ~.II

1

Third, there are simply a "stack" of unanswered issues which

2were litigated to this Court that the State of Idaho did not even
3 attempt to answer.
4

It was the State District Court Judge who informed the

5 Petitionerfdn~tgg the Rule 35 hearing, that these claims should be
6 brought before the Court in a Post Conviction Petition.
7

It was Post Conviction Counsel that failed to act as the

8 District Curt ordered that Counsel to so act.
9

The Appellant tried to combine the Appeal from the Rule 35

10 Denial, and the instant Appeal. He was denied this request. Now,
11 after the ~ppellant made such a request, now the State of Idaho
12 would try to impose a Res Judicata argument upon the Appeal. That
14 is not the act of a member of the bar and an Officer of this Court
15 in seeking Justice. Not at all.
16

The State of Idaho should not be trying to compel the

- 17 Appellant to serve a sentence of life without any possibility of
18 parole or release, when the State knows full well that it is an
19 unjust sentence. It is not authorized by law. It is an illegal
20

sentence. It is not contained within the sentencing frame-work of

21

the Unified Sentencing Act. It just does not exist.

22

A sentence of life without parole is reserved for the most

23

terrible crimes in the state of Idaho. It is the second most severe

24

punishment that can be imposed in the State of Idaho. One that if

25

imposed for the crime of first degree murder, must have a jury

26

weigh the aggravating factors before the imposition of it as a

27

sentence. It is a default sentence for the death penalty. So, how can

28

it be imposed for a crime that is not death penalty eligible?

R@p)y Brief ••••••••••••••••••••• III

1
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Appellant filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief,

3

and in that Petition, the Appellant raised several issues, anyone

4

of which would have entitled him to relief.

5
6

7

The District Court appointed Counsel to represent the
Appellant during the Post Conviction Process.
The District Court ordered Counsel to prepare and to file

8

a Responsive pleading during the Post Conviction Process, but

9

appointed Counsel refused to do so.

10

The District Court dismissed the Petition for Post

11

Conviction Relief, finding that it was not timely filed, even

12

though the Petition established claims of ineffective assistance

13
14

15
16
17

of Counsel, and

claimed that the District Court lacked subject

matter Jurisdiction to have imposed the sentence that it did.
The Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and
appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender to represent
the Appellant during the Appeal process.
The Office of the State Appellate Defender moved to be

18

allowed to withdraw as the attorney of record, the Idaho State
19

Supreme Court allowed such Motion to withdraw, and the Appellant
20

does now submit this Brief in a Pro-Se format.
21

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
22

A).
23

Did the District Court Err When It Dismissed The
Petition For Post Conviction Relief?

24
25

Reply Brief of Appellant-1

ARGUMENT OF FACTS AND LAW
2

In the Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the Petitioner

3

alleged that he was sentenced illegally, and that an illegal

4

sentence could be corrected at any time.
The District Court disagreed with this holding and entered

5
6
7

an Order dismissing this claim, and dismissing the Petition for
Post Conviction Relief.
The Sentence Imposed Is Illegal And Due Process
Of Law Demands That It Be Corrected.

8

First, a challenge to a Court's subject matter Jurisdiction

9
10

maybe raised at any time during the course of the proceedings,

11

even for the first time on Appeal, and may not be waived by the

12

parties. State V. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 374, 195 P.3d 731,

13

14

733, (2008); State V. McCarthy; 133 Idaho 119, 122, 982 P.2d 954,
957,

(1999).
Any order entered without subject matter jurisdiction is

15

oid. Troupis V. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 79, 218 P.3d 1138, 1140,
16

(2009); Andre V. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359,
17

(1984).
18

The Appellant was convicted of the offense of Robbery, a
19

20
21

22
23

24
25

iolation of the Idaho Code, Title 18, Section 6501-6503.
The Punishment for the crime of Robbery is contained within the
Idaho Code, §18-6503,

where it is stated:

§18-6503. Punishment for Robbery.

Robbery is punishable by imprisonment in the State
Prison fpr not less than five, (5), years, and the
punishment may extend to life.
It is based upon this clear language that the::·minimum.. term

Reply Brief<of Appellant-2

1 for the crime of Robbery is five,

(5)

years, and it is d~picted:

2 for in the statute itself.
3
4

At the time of the imposition of the sentence, the Court
ntered an Order which sentenced the Appellant to a term of

5 "Fixed" life. This is also called a "Determinate" life sentence,
6
7

r "life without the possibility of parole".
The Appellant does not argue that the Court could not have

8

imposed a sentence of "Life" for the crime of Robbery. The entire

9

argument is based upon the belief that the Court did not have the

10
11

Jurisdiction to have "fixed" the Life sentence.
The-ability to "fix"

or to make "Determinate"

any part

12

of a sentence is contained within the Unified Sentencing Act,

13

which is codified at §19-2513.

14

15

Under the Unified Sentencing Act, the Determinate portion
of a criminal sentence is considered to be the minimum term,

16 during which the criminal defendant is not eligible for parole
17

18

r any type of sentence reduction for "Good-time".
However, not all criminal Statutes are able to have the

19

minimum or determinate terms entered by the Court. Some criminal

20

Statutes carry within them a pre-set minimum term. Robbery is

21
22
23

24

one of those criminal Statutes.
When a Court is sentencing a criminal defendant under the
Unified sentencing act.for a crime that carries a pre-set
minimum term in the statute itself, the sentencing Court must
use the second paragraph of the Unified Sentencing Act, which:

25

is located at §19-2513.

Reply Brief of Appellant -3

§19-2513. Unified Sentence, (Second Paragraph) States:

1

If the offense carries a mandatory minimum penalty
as provided by Statute, the Court SHALL specify a
minimum period of confinement consistent with such
Statute •••••

2
3
4

This paragraph of the Unified Sentencing Act uses the

5

6
7
8

ord SHALL to command a court in what it must do. In this case a
ourt shall specify a minimum period of confinement consistent
ith such Statute.
The Statute in question is Robbery, and it carries within

9

he Statute a five,

(5) year minimum period of confinement.

10

Because the Statute carries within it a minimum period of
11

onfinement, the Court must specify a minimum period,. (or fixed
12

erm), which is consistent with the minimum period of confinement
13

pecified in the Statute. In this case it is five,

14

15

(5), years.

So, when the Court ordered the Appellant to be sentenced
to a term of life, and then ordered that the entire term of life

16

be made fixed or determinate, the Court violated the Unified

17

Sentencing Act's second paragraph.

18

Not all criminal Statutes in the State of Idaho carry a

19

minimum term within the statutes themselves. For instance, the

20

crime of Aggravated Battery is punishable by a term of

21

imprisonment of fifteen (15), years. There is no mention of a

22

minimum period of confinement mentioned in the statute, and for

23

24
25

this reason it is the first paragraph of the Unified Sentencing
Act that a Court must use when imposing a sentence for the crime
of Aggravated Battery, and the Court can fix any or all of the
term.

Reply
1

Brief of Appellant-4

1

But, because the crime of Robbery,

(For which the Appellant

2

was sentenced), carries within the Statute a minimum period of

3

Confinement, the Unified Sentencing Act mandates that the set

4

minimum period of confinement, (Fixed.term), be consistent with

5

the minimum term as set by the statute. Please see, §19-2513,

6
7

second paragraph.
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, the Eleventh
Edition, explains the term Consistent as follows:

8

9

consistent: Free from variation; Tending to be true and
close to the meaning of an item; Showing
steady conformity.

10

11

However, that is not really important because we all know

12

what consistent means. In this case consistent means that the

13

Court at the time the sentence was pronounced should have entere

14

15
16

a fixed term that was in some way consistent to the five,

(5),

year minimum term as was set by statute. It is clear and it is
not even remotely disputable that a term of fixed life is not
consistent with a five,

(5) year term.

17

In the State of Idaho, when a criminal Statute carriej
18

within the Statute a minimum term, then, under the Unified
19

Sentencing Act, Paragraph 2, the Court SHALL orde~ the Fixed
20
21
22

term to be consistent with the minimum term as stated in the
Statute. This leaves the Court the complete discretion to order
a maximum term as the court feels to be just and fair for that

23

particular case, but this shall be ordered as the indeterminate

24

term, and not "Fixed".

25

Reply_ Brief of Appellant-5

1

In light of these plain facts, it is absolutely clear that

2

when the Court imposed a sentence of. "Fixed Life", (Life without

3

the possibility of Parole), upon the Petitioner, the court lacked

4

the ability to' impose such a sentence. The Court Lacked Subject

s

matter Jurisdiction.

6

The Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho, in the case of

7

state V. Peterson, 148.Idaho 610, 226 P.3d 552, (2010), Staed as

8

fo,llows:

9

'- ••• Subject matter jurisdiction can be raised
by any party at any time, and can not be waived"

10

11

This was also the Holding of the Idaho State supreme Court

12

in the case of State V. Lute, 252 P.3d 1255, (2011), where the

13

court held as follows:

14

'' •• Judgments and Orders made without subject
matter jurisdiction are void, and are subject to
collateral attack •••••• subject matter jurisdiction
can never be waived or consented to, and a Court
has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subjec
matter jurisdiction".

15
16
17

18
19
20

This above holding was cited in Lute, Supra, based upon
the holding of State

v.

Urrabazo, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248-1249, (1996.

The subject matter jurisdiction to impose any particular

21

sentence in a criminal case, is contained within the Statute it's

22

self. The crime for.which the Petitioner stands convicted of,

23

Robbery, is punishable by a sentence of five years, (5), to an

24

indeterminate life. No where in the statute does it speak in

25

terms of a "Fixed Life" term being able to be imposed.
Reply·
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1

"Legislative intent must first be determined from the plain

2

meaning of the words used, and, if the plain meaning is direct

3

and certain, and it is unambiguous, the Statute speaks for

4

itself". Crist V. Segna, 622 P.2d 1028, (1981).

5

"It is well established that a Court must give meaning and

6

effect to all Statutory provisions". Montana Contractors Assn.

7

V. Department of Highways,

8
9

10
11

12

The intent of the Legislature when it passed the Unified
Sentencing Act is clear and unambiguous. The Statute speaks for
itself. In the second paragraph of the Unified Sentencing Act,
it is stated,
§19-2513, (Second Paragraph)
If the offense carries a mandatory minimum
penalty as provided by Statute, the Court shall
specify_a minimum period of confinement
consistent with such statute.

13

14

15

715 P.2d 1056, (1986).

The only thing this Court need to look to is whether or

16

not the Appellant is convicted of an offense which Statute

17

carries a minimum period of confinement within that Statute, and

18

if the Appellant has been given a minimum period of confinement

19

which is not consistent with that Statute then his sentence is

20
21

22

illegal and is subject to correction at any time.
The Appellant is convicted of the offense of Robbery, in
the Statute for the punishment of the crime of Robbery, there is
a minimum penalty provided for in that Statute. It is a five,(5),

23

year period.
24

Because the Appellant was given a minimum period of
25

confinement of "Fixed Life", his sentence is illegal,. as it is

aeply· Brief of Appellant-?

1

not "consistent" with the minimum period of confinement was -

2

the legislature depicted for in the punishment for Robbery; and

3

as is provided for in the second paragraph of the Unified

4

Sentencing Act for such crimes that carry a minimum period in

5

6

7

the statute.
Because the Court did not follow the statutory commands
as depicted for b¥ the Legislature of the State of Idaho, the
Court has denied to the Appellant Due Process of Law under the

8

United states Constitution, Amendment Fourteen.
9

"The failure of a State to follow it's own statutory
10

commands may implicate a liberty interest protected by the
11
12
13

14
15

Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause". Fetterly V. Paskett,
997 F.2d 1295, (9th Cir. 1993); Ballard V. Estelle, 937 F.2d
453, (9th Cir. 1991); Lambright

v.

Stewart, 167 F.3d 477, (9th

Cir. 1999).
Paraprased, "a State's failure to follow it's own laws,

16

violates the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause" Hicks V.

17

Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 65 l.Ed.2d 175, (1979).

18

In this case, the State of Idaho failed to follow the

19

clear and mandatory language of the Unified Sentencing Act, at

20

the second paragraph, and when it failed to follow those mandates

21

22

it denied to the Appellant Due Process of Law by imposing a
sentence that is not authorized by law, and is illegal.
The District Court, when it dismissed the Petition for

23

Post Conviction Relief, also erred and denied to the Appellant
24

he ability to correct this issue.
25

Furthermore, the Appellant raised a valid claim of

~eply Brief of Appellant-8

.

'

1

Ineffective Assistance of counsel, in that Counsel should have

2

known the difference between

3

of Life Without Parole, or a "Fixed
A

4

a

sentence of Life, and a sentence
Life~ term.

valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be

5

used as a "gateway 11 to over-come a procedure bar to having such

6

claims heard by a reviewing court. Pl.ease see, Martinez

7

132

8

501 U.S. 722, 111

s.ct.

1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272, (2012), Thompson

s.ct.

2546,. 115 L.Ed. 2d 640,

(

v.

Ryan,

v. Coleman,
}.

9

And, finally, it was the Court who imposed the Sentence upon

10

the Petitioner who has violated Due Process of Law when the Court

11

first, at the arraignment, and at the initial appearance, who

12

informed the Petitioner that the maximum possible sentence that

13

he was facing, was a term of life; and then this same Court, who

14

at the time of the imposition of the sentence, stated, " ••• I'll

15

go one better, .(when the Stace sought a sentence ot 20 to life),

16

then imposed a sentence of :idetermiante life", which is a term of

17

"r"'ixed Life 11 or life without the possibility of Parole.
This action in and of it self violates the fundamental

18
19

principles of Due Process of Law, and fundamental fairness upon

20

which our country was founded, and violates the Sixth Amendment

21

to the United States Constitution.

22

The order of this court, which stated that this case would be

23

dismissed within 20 days, if the Petitioner did not show cause

24

as to why it should not be dismissed, seems to over-look the fact

25

that there is no time limitations in which to challenge the

Reply
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Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Court.

1
2

The District Court, appointed Counsel to assist the

3

Appellant in the Post Conviction Petition. The Court also ordere

4

that Counsel to file an Amended Petition, and to respond to the

5

Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss.
That Counsel, Randall Barnum, refused to comply with the

6
7
8

Order of the Court, and instead rendered ineffective assistance
of Counsel when he refused to litigate to the District Court
the issues raised in the Petition for Post Conviction Relief,

9

such as are listed herein:
10

a).

That the Sentencing Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to impose a fixed life sentence
for the crime of robbery;

b).

Trial Counsel was ineffective for not properly
investigating this case prior to Trial;

C) •

Trial Counsel was ineffective for not
challenging the photo-line up of suspects,
when I was the only individual shown to
the witnesses;

d).

Trial Counsel was ineffective for not p~~suing
any form of plea bargain with the State;

e).

Denial of Due Process of Law when the Court,
at my Arraignment, informed me that I faced a
sentence of LIFE. Not a sentence of Fixed Life,
which is clearly more than a Life sentence.

11
12
13

14
15
16

17
18
19

I asked Mr. Barnum, who was appointed to represent me in

20
21

the Post Conviction case, about these claims, and he informed me

22

that, " ••• claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can not be

23

filed outside of any timelimitations, and that the case of
artinez

24

v.

Ran, 132 s.ct.1309, (2012),

xception to the holding of Thompson

25
(

v.

did not make an
Coleman, 501 U.S. 722,

), no matter what I had read. I also raised these claims:

Reply
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f).

1

2

I believe that my Trial Counsel was ineffective fo
not informing me that I faced a FIXED LIFE term,
and not just an indeterminate life term.

g). ·1 believe that I·was denied my right to the
effective assistance of counsel during the direct
appeal process' because' appellate c"ounsel did not
speak to me regarding the issues or mistakes made
during trial, or what issues I wanted to raise in
the.direct appeal.

3

4
5
6

h).

I believe that Appellate Counsel was ineffective
for not raising on direct appeal, a claim of trial
counsel being ineffective.

i).

I believe that Appellate Counsel was ineffective
for not seeking a Petition for Rehearing in the
Idaho State Supreme Court.

j).

I believe that Appellate Counsel was ineffective
for not informing the Petitioner of the fact that
a decision had been reached by the Idaho· state
Court of Appeals, which would have startea·the
time limit for filing a Petition For Post OJnviction
Relief, and or a Federal Petition For a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.

k).

I believe that counsel was ineffective for not
filing a Motion for a sentence reduction under
Idaho Criminal Court Rule 35.

1).

I believe that Counsel was ineffective.for not
making a challenge on appeal, to the length of my
sentence.

m).

I have been denied Due Process of Law because I
was never given a copy of the discovery material
in my case, which prevented me from making a
decision as to going to trail, trying to make a
plea agreement; furthermore, the action of not
giving me a copy of my discovery material has also
prevented me from researching issues to be raised
on appeal.

7

a·
9

10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17

1 a·
19

20
21
22

Mr. Barm.im did not believe that there was any type of

23

24- ~merit ·to these 6laims nor·would he ~rgue them for me. The

25 fcbu~t- made it clear that she expected a.claim to b~ raised

Reply
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against Mr. Barnum for being Ineffective in this case because
2

he had not filed any type of documents to assist the Appellant.
The Appellant also now raises two additional claims as

3
4

follows:

5

aa).

That Post Conviction Counsel, Randall Barnum,
Was Ineffective for not performing ANY Court
ordered responses, nor investigating this case;

bb).

That the Appellant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel when the Office of the
State Appellate Defender refused to litigate
this case on appeal.

6
7

8

CONCLUSION

9

Pending before this Court is a sister case under number

10

11

40830, which raises the exact same issue as presented to the

12

Court in this case.
The Appellant believes that it was error for this court

13
14
15
16

to not consolidate the cases together into one appeal as the
Office of the State Appellate defender does not have a competent
argument on appeal, and the Appellant pro-se certainly does.
The Office of the State Attorney General has now made a

17

concession that the cases of Martinez V. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309,
18

(2012); and Trevino

v.

Thaler, 133 s.ct. 1911, (2013), apply to

19

the State of Idaho.
20
21

Based upon these two cases, there is an exception to the
proc~dural time bar for claims of ineffective assistance of.·

22

Counsel, and it was error for the district court, and for Mr.

23

Barnum not to have recognized this exception and litigated the

24

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to the Court.

25

Reply

Brief of Appellant-12

1

It is clear that the sentence which was pronounced upon

2

the Appellant is not provided for by Statute. Just as clear, the

3

crime of Robbery is one of the crimes which carries within itsel

4

a minimum term.~These crimes are the ones which are specifically

5

named in the second paragraph of §19-2513.
Because the State of Idaho did not following the mandatory

6
7
8

9

language of §19-2513, :: Second Paragraph,, when it sentenced the
Appellant, the sentence imposed is illegal and must, as a matter
of law and justice, be corrected.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Court

10

enter an Order which directs the District Court to re-sentence
11

the Appellant in conformity to the Unified Sentencing Act, which
12

is codified at §19-2513. (Second Paragraph).
13

OATH OF APPELLANT
14

Comes now, Ray M. Nichols, the Appellant herein, who does
15
16
17

Declare, under the United States Code, Title 28, Section 1746,
that the enclosed Brief is true and correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief.

18

lant Pro-Se
19
20
21
22

23
24

25

Reply

Brief of Appellant-13

